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Ralph Norman Channell 
L INTRODUCTION 
I ntelligence support to the operating forces has been restructured to provide intelligence required along the joint command organization. Although there have been joint intelligence organWttions previously, most intelligence support was provided along service lines. The 
new structure is a major departure from the previous organization. The new structure is primarily 
a reflection of the new joint command structure with its emphasis on the CJCS, the Joint Smff: the 
CINC's, and the Joint Task Force. The new intelligence structure was strongly insisted upon by 
the DoD and key congressional committees. Major cuts in the intelligence community (funding 
and personnel) were also important filctors in the restructuring. The services were generally 
opposed to the new concept, although Naval Intelligence was quick to recognize the advantages 
of early participation. 
Another key factor enabling the establishment of centralized IlC's was the advent of 
decentralized computer based systems and improved data communications connectivity, 
permitting centralized data storage and rapid dissemination. The appearance of the Joint Defense 
Intelligence Support System 9J)ISS) and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications 
System (JWICS) are prime examples of the availability of the new systems and connectivity. 
Another major development is the production of the new joint intelligence publications, 
and the intelligence Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP's). These publications are 
establishing common doctrine and terms for the military intelligence community. However, some 
confusion still exists regarding intelligence terminology. F cir example, the Navy still uses the tenn 
OPINTEL to mean what is now defined more closely as tactical intelligence. This paper uses 
tenns as defined in Joint Pub 2-0, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations", in 
which strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence are described as supporting those three 
levels of warfare, and intelligence production is divided among I&W, current, general military 
intelligence (GMI), targeting, and technical categories of intelligence. 
• 
-T.h.e remainder of this paper will describe the structure and functions oftlie major JIC's, 












ll. NATIONAL MILITARY JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER 
(NMJIC) 
The NMJIC is the part of the JCS 12 organiution which provides crisis support to the Secretmy of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Smfl: and the Joint Staff Other elements of the J2 produce joint intelligence publications, support the Joint Staff as action 
officers, and provide the DIA representatives to the CINC's. 
Within the NMJIC are divisions that form and dispatch "National Intelligence Support 
Teams" (NIST's) for JTF augmentation, provide targeting and BDA support, operate the Defense 
Intelligence Network (DIN), and man and operate the NMJIC. A J2 organiution chart is 
attached. 
The NMJIC handles crisis intelligence and current intelligence as needed, while other 
current intelligence production is accomplished at the DIA National Mllitmy Intelligence 
Production Center (Nl\fiPC) at Bolling AFB, Anacostia. When a specific crisis occurs, a "Crisis 
Cell" is set up in the NMJIC as the initial effort, then as the threat increases, a "Crisis Working 
Group" is established, then lastly, an "Intelligence Task Force•. Efforts are coordinated with other 
intelligence agencies and with the DIA Operatiohal Intelligence Coordination Center at the 
NMIPC. The NMJIC handles crisis RFl's when the crisis reaches the "Working Group" stage. 
The NMJIC then has tasking authority with the intelligence community for the crisis. In general, 
CIA concentrates on political and economic intelligence, while DIA concentrates on military 
intelligence. This flexible response to crises is sometimes referred to as the "Burger King" 
approach to intelligence management. 
The NMJIC normally has 60 to 70 analysts assigned, maintaining a 24 hour watch. At any 
given time, there may be as many as three crisis w:orking groups in operation, e.g., Balkans, Haiti, 
and Africa. During the Haiti operation, there were about· 100 personnel in the Haiti Intelligence 
Task Force. Flexibility is key to the team effort in the NM.Ile. 
Connectivity to others in Washington is via JWICS/JDISS and person to person (secure 
phone, etc.). Connectivity to other IlCflAC's is via JWICS/JDISS, to include secure video 
teleconferencing. A connectivity chart is attached. The NMJIC is shifting to a JCSIJ3 UNIX based 
operating system which will eventually run at multi-level security. Intel Link is becoming an 
important connectivity asset also . 
... 
Collection management is accomplished by the DIA Defense Collection Coordination 
Center (DCCC), located adjacent to the NMJIC. The DCCC is part of the DIA National Military 
Intelligence Collection Center (NMICC), but is responsive to the J2, and operates, in effect, as 
3 
part of the NMJIC when a crisis occurs. 
The JDISS is key to the NMJIC connectivity. JDISS bas the capability to conduct 
"chatter", email, and database queries with other IlC's, as well as imagery retrieval and 
manipulation. The JDISS is relatively easy to operate; however, accessing the various databases 
is another matter, requiring passwords and fiuniliarity with other systems. The JDISS uses a 
UNIX based workstation with peripherals, and can use various means of connectivity including 
the JWICS and the STIJ Ill. The IDISS is mamged under the JCS J2, but the Program Office is 
resident in Suitlan~ MD, at the National Maritime Intelligence Center. 
Targeting and BDA are now crucial functions for the NMJIC, with some 20 personnel 
involved in this process. Due to NCA and JCS requirements for immediate BDA, the NMJIC now 
has first phase imagery and IDEX capabilities. BDA information ftom other sources must be 
received and analyud rapidly if it is to be useful BDA is coordinated with the appropriate CINC's 
and other members of the Intelligence Community using the JDISS and the interactive video 
capabilities of the JWICS. 
An I&W system still exists, accomplished as part of crisis intelligence in the NMJIC, in 
coordination with NSA and the appropriate CINC, especially with regard to watch conditions. 
There is a tie with allied systems as well. 
The NMJIC "floor" is divided into nuinerous cubicles both geographic and functional. It is 
full of computer terminals and telephones. There are representatives from CIA, NSA, Technical 
Operational Intelligence (TOPINT), the services, DIA regional desks, and DMA. A Cryptologic 
Support Group (CSG) from NSA, consisting of 20 to 25 personnei maintains a watch team of 
about five for COMINT and BLINT support. The NMJIC relies heavily on augmentation, 
especially during crises; however, the current trend is towards a more permanent organiz.ation. 
Minimum tours are supposed to be three months long, there is a training course, and augment 
cadre from other organizations are pre-trained and identified. The geographic desks are usually 
manned by the DIA NMIPC, but could be manned by the services and/or other agencies as well. 
Each service bas a desk on the floor, and although service current intelligence was to have moved 
to the NMJIC, the services have retained a capability for tlµs function in their respective service 
centers. · 
UN support is accomplished at two levels by a UN support desk on the NMJIC "floor". 
Level I intelligence is only "show and tell" not for keeping, while Level Il is basically unclassified. 
Level II is passed to the UN situation room in New York providing essentially unclassified 
intelligence. Level I intelligence is passed to the U.S. UN Mission SCIF. Connectivity is via 
JDISS. There are also desks that link the NMJIC with the U.K., Canada, and ~a. 
Connectiyity with these nations is now via JWICS. There is a Linked Operations1Intelligence 
Center Europe (LOCE) terminal in the NMJIC which provides connectivity to EUCOM and 





c There are usually about 15 personnel minimum at the NMJIC standard desks, plus another 20-25 in the various working groups on the "floor" at any given time. 
The Defense Intelligence Network is a classified broadcast that has its studios as part of 
the NMJIC. The DIN broadcasts items of current intelligence interest 17 hoµrs per day, increasing 
to 24 hours during crises. Programming is from sources around the Intelligence Community and 
connectivity is via the JWICS. 
As noted above, the JCS 12 also produces joint intelligence doctrine publications. The 
keystone publication for intelligence, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations" 
Qoint Pub 2-0) is out and in use. "Four other supporting publications, "Joint Intelligence Support 
to Military Operations" (Joint Pub 2-01), "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations" 
Qoint Pub 2-02), "JTTP for MC&G Support" Qoint Pub 2-03), and "JTTP .for Intelligence 
Support toTargeting" (Joint Pub 2-01.1), are in various stages of draft. "Doctrine/JTTP for 
Counterintelligence" (Joint Pub 2-01.2) has been published and is in use. Attached is a copy of the 
joint intelligence publication structure. 
The JCS J2's have tried to: 
• Make the NMJIC the pre-eminent intelligence watch center in Washington; 
• o . 
Transition the briefing team to video format using JWICS; 
Produce professional products including "world class" briefing material. 
) 
It appears that all these objectives have been accomplished in highly professional manner. 
It is very impressive to see the intelligence personnel ftom the various parts of the community 
working together bringing their expertise to bear regarding geographic ar~ collection systems, 
data systems, and connectivity, while keeping everything together from an assessment and 
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Ill. U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND 
Atlantic Command was a &st mover in the effort to establish the IlC's. Planning for the new Atlantic Intelligence Command (AIC) started in early 1990, and the AIC was established in May 1991. The concept was to consolidate intelligence operations and 
organi7.8tions into one intelligence organi7.ation to provide better support to Atlantic Command 
forces. The new organintion consolidated such intelligence commands as FICEURLANT, 
FOSICLANT, LANTilC, and others, to include parts of the now ACOM and LANTFLT staffs . 
. The number of personnel on the ACOM and LANTFLT staffs bas been reduced to only 
those needed for policy and management functions. Intelligence production and systems support is 
now vested in the AIC, with the Commander of AIC also a member of the ACOM/LANTFLT/ 
SACLANT staffs for intelligence operations. 
Emphasis at AIC is on support to the ACOM mission of joint force training/adaptive joint 
force packaging. The IlC part of AIC is the watch team that handles J&W, Current Intelligence, 
RFI's, etc. - the daily support to the operating forces. The IlC is the "front door" to the AIC for 
commands needing support. The nc watch team consists of some eight members during the 
normal course of events, augmenting from~ AIC to about 17 as needed, and to around 25 for a 
major crisis. 
The number of personnel in the AIC bas been reduced from a previous 1,000 or so to a 
current level of around 700 personnel. Over half of these arc Navy, with the remainder divided 
among Air Force, Marine Corps, Army and civilian personnel. The AIC structure lias been altered 
to include directorates for Operations (production), Field Support, Resources (systems), and a 
group for Customer Support. As noted above, emphasis is on joint force training and 
augmentation, especially the use of JDISS and intelligence teams for joint force packaging. 
Intelligence Operations includes the production of databases, GMI, current intelligence, targeting 
materials, etc .. The Field Support Directorate includes three teams of 15 personnel each for 
augmentation during exercises and ~· Resources provi~es the systems and connectivity assets 
in support of the AIC. 
AIC has participated in several joint force exercises, notably the Ocean Venture series in 
which the ITF flagship, USS Mount Whitney, was augmented and an afloat IlC was established. 
Connectivity between the afloat nc and AICmc was via JDISS and a partial JWICS. 
11 
The attached graphics illustrate the ACOM AIC IlC mission and responsibilities, the IlC watch 
"accordion" structure, and the large crisis manning plan. Attached also is a graphic that illustrates 
bandwidth capabilities for various systems, and bandwidth requirements for JWICS and JDISS. 
The AIC and its IlC performed exceedingly well during the recent Haiti crisis. As described by 
Rear Admiral Tom Wtlson in an article in the Joint Force Quarterly, the combination of the IlC 
structure, the connectivity using JWICS and JDISS, a common TI'P, and experience gained from 
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IV. U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND 
Pacific Command emphasis is on regional issues and crises, and has resulted in the establishment of a two tier command and control structure for the Pacific AOR. Specific operational commanders are to be activated as JTF commanders to meet crises as required, 
and will be augmented from CINCP AC by the Deployable JTF Augmentation Cell (DITF AC). 
To support these operations, a new joint intelligence structure has been established, 
centered around the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (IlCPAC). IlCP AC was formed in July 
1991, consolidating the former FICPACJFOSIC, IPAC, and the USAF 548th RTG. By 1993, the 
new IlCP AC consisted of some 900 personnel, but is in the process of being reduced to about 
800 personnel. About 300/o of the personnel are Navy, 30% Air Force, with the remainder divided 
among Army, Marine Corps, and civilian personnel. The former FIC at Makalapa is the location 
of the Commander, most intelligence production, systems managemen~ and the current 
intelligence "watch floor". Target materials, expeditionary wartare support, and the photo lab are 
at Hickam AFB. The current intelligence watch provides daily support to the operating forces, 
and, ofNavy interest, has assumed the functions of the former FOSIC Hawaii and some of the 
functions of the former FOSIF Kamiseya. 
The P ACOM J2 and staff retain policy Q>ntrol over intelligence functions in the Pacific 
Command, especially with regard to architecture, validation of requirements, joint TTP, collection 
policy, etc .. The PACOM 12 hosts a PACOM Intelligence Board that discusses major intelligence 
matters, and consists of the component commander 10.'s, JTF J2's, and others as invited. 
FOSIF Kamiseya has recently been reassigned as IlCPAC Detachment (JDET), and will 
provide joint intelligence expertise and augmentation for the northwest Pacific area. JDET has 
moved from its former location at Kamiseya to Yokota AFB, Japan. 
The P ACOM architecture concept calls for a series of intelligence system servers called 
P ASS's (P ACOM ADP Server Sites) located at IlCPAC iii Hawaii, Yokota AFB in Japan (site of 
IDET), Korea, and at ffiCPAC/JITAP in San Diego. The PACOM PASS nodes are being 
connected with JWICS and contain the various databases and imagery needed by the operating 
forces. An imagery bulletin board has been established by IlCPAC. Primary access for the 
operating forces will be via "pulls" using JDISS. There also is a plan for forces to be able to build 
their own databases using CD ROM technology, pulling from the IlCP AC/PASS databases . 
• 
· Jl(;PAC emphasis is on watch teams for current/I&W intelligence, and on augmentation 
and production for other customer support. The watch teams have some 15 personnel on watch at 
any time, augmented by Crisis Action Support Cells as needed. Support is to the prime potential 
JTF's: COM7THFLT, I CORPS, ill MEF, and to the standing J1F's: Joint Interagency Task 
17 
Force West (IlATFW) and ITF Full Accounting. The IlCP AC, by MOU, provides special 
support for CINCP ACFL T intelligence briefings and submarine warfare analysis. 
IlCPAC support to the operating forces is provided by an area scheme, with JDET 
covering the Pacific north of Korea, IlCP AC covering south of Korea to the CENTCOM AOR., 
and J2 US Forces Korea using the SOlst MI Brigade as a "mini IlC" to cover Korea. ITF support 
will be via a "Named Area Of Interest" (NAI) concept, currently in operation for the standing 
JTFs, to be provided to the crisis JTFs when activated. 
The IlC is connected interactive with Australian Naval Intelligence at MIC Sydney for the 
interchange of maritime intelligence. 
MOUs are being established with COMUSFORCES Korea to avoid duplication of 
intelligence support in the Korean area, and an MOU has been established with ONI to provide 
for coverage of naval and shipping matters, and to avoid duplication. 
Attached are graphics depicting the CINCP AC J2 organization, the IlCPAC structure, and the 
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V. U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 
Central Command has a unique problem regarding intelligence support because the intelligence structure is filr removed from the AOR, and is not as well developed as those of the more established areas such as ACOM and PACOM The nc is located in the 
CENTCOM headquarters building at MacDill AFB in Tampa, Florida, and is increasing in size 
from about 200 personnel to around 300, with plans for further increases to a posSiole 500. 
Additional space is being made available at MacDill AFB, and at least the GMI and other 
production efforts should move out of their currently crowded spaces for the new facilities. 
The CENTCOM JIC provides support to JTF SWA (Southwest Asia) and, to a certain 
extent. to NAVCENT forces. During operations in Somalia, the IlC provided support to the 
CENTCOM Intelligence Support Element (CISE) there. Due to the relatively small number of 
personnel at the CENTCOM IlC, the main effort is in support of the various crises and current/ 
I&W intelligence. Basic intelligence production is at a minimum until adequate resources are on 
board. Also, the concept for JTF manning is to have the services provide augmentation since the 
CENTCOM IlC manning is relatively low. In addition, the IlC has agreements with other IlC's 
and with component intelligence organi7.Btions for certain OB, target materials, and other basic 
intelligence production to be accomplished at these other locations until the nc is adequately 
manned and able to take over. The CENTCOM-JIC is assuming these functions as its assets 
mcrease. 
CENTCOM nc is heavily into RFI management and response. Most RFI's are handled via 
JDISS, and the JIC has estab~shed a system to assign priorities, track progress, and issue weekly 
status summaries. 
It is interesting to note that each service component commander still seems to retain its 
own intelligence production capability: the Army {Third Army) has the 513th MI Brigade at 
Atlanta, GA, the Air Force (N"mth Air Force) has the 480th,Intelligence Group at Shaw AFB, and 
the Navy is building a support element of some 30 persomiel in Bahrain. Naval Intelligence 
support is provided via three different groups: on board the NAVCENI' flagship for I&W /Current 
Intelligence, all source fusion, and policy guidance. The more extensive analysis and imagery 
support is produced by the support detachment in Bahrain, while the plans, programs, 
architecture, and budget functions are accomplished by a small group at NAVCENT (REAR) at 
Tampa. Latest changes to NAVCENI' include the shift of the afloat staff ashore, and the 




Attached are graphics showing the basic CENTCOM IlC structure and the planned connectivity. 
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OBJECTIVE COLLATERAL IMAGERY DISSEMINATION ARCHITECTURE 1 NOV 93 
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0 VL U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND 
Strategic Command was established in June 1992 at Offutt AFB near Omaha, Nebraska, and essentially combined much of the former SAC stafl: and JSTPS, the producer of the SIOP. STRATCOM is a functional combatant commander, acquiring all nuclear forces when on 
patrol in the case of SSBNs, and when generated in the case of ICBMs and bombers. Component 
commanders and supporting commanders provide support when needed. STRATCOM has 
COCOM over nuclear forces (but not necessarily OPCON); however, the Commander Task 
Forces form when a nuclear alert is generated, taking OPCON of the nuclear forces. Day to day 
OPCON is normally exercised by the component commanders: CINCLANTFLT, CINCPACFLT, 
ACC, and AFSPACECOM 
Intelligence support is provided by the STRATCOM nc, which consisted initially of some 1400 
personne~ but is in the process of decrementing to around 550 personnel, with an additional 100 
working in the IlC but assigned to SPACECOM The IlC is an integral part of the STRATCOM 
12 sUlfl: fonning three of the seven divisions of the 12 directorate. Imagery is clearly the strong 
point of the STRATCOM IlC, with extensive machinery to perform imagery functions. The main 
areas of interest for the IlC include the four nuclear republics of the Former Soviet Union, the 
Peoples Republic of China, North Korea, and'the field of proliferation of weapons of mass c destruction. 
0 
The attached charts depict the basic STRATCOM IlC and 12 organi7.ation as well as current 
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VIL U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND 
European Command is more complex in many respects than the other CINC's, especially for intelligence, because of its close integration with the NATO nations. 
The Joint Intelligence Center is not located close to the EUCOM headquarters in 
Stutt~ Germany, but is at Molesworth, UK, north of London, and is called the Joint Analysis 
Center (JAC). The JAC is relatively new, reaching only an initial operational capability in 
September 1991, formed from components of the EUCOM staff and several analysis centers. The 
JAC is in the process of building to 600 or 700 personne~ when fully manned. Full operational 
capability was expected in 1995. The Navy has contributed billets to the JAC from FOSIF Rota 
and FOSIC London, and has shifted from reliance on intelligence support from service assets to 
reliance on the JAC. FOSIF Rota has greatly decreased in size, and will phase out in 1996. 
Naples has become an important intelligence support area, with a IlC to support Balkan 
operations, a NATO Southern Region JOIC, and support to the Sixth Fleet. 
EUCOM has created the new Joint Analysis Center (JAC) at Molesworth in England to be 
its primary center for intelligence support. In addition, EUCOM anticipates that at least some 
current intelligence support will continue to be provided by component service intelligence 
organizations, although this appears to be in a changing state. USAREUR still has MI/CEWI 
capability in Europe, USAFE has intelligence squadrons, and for NATO, there remains the Swvey 
Section at SHAPE and the JOIC's for the NATO Northwest, Central, and Southern Regions. The 
JOIC's are the main conduit fqr providing US intelligence support to the NATO regions. 
The EUCOM concept for contingency warfare is the Joint Task Force/Coalition Task 
Force (JTF/CTF) operation, with basic support provided by the JAC, and tacticaVoperational 
support provided by on-scene assets and the automated systems. These systems have been 
developed or are currently in development to support the rapid analysis and dissemination of 
intelligence. The basic system is EISS (EUCOM Intelligenec Support System), a UNIX based 
workstation, currently deployed, containing EUCOM message traffic, and providing ready access 
to various intelligence databases. The LOCE (Linked Operations/Intelligence Center Europe) is 
another UNIX based workstation designed to provide intelligence support to NATO, and is 
currently operational throughout many US and NATO commands in Europe. LOCE is the 
primary gateway to the NATO nations, runs at the "Secret Releasable to NATO" leve~ has both a 
dynamic current intelligence function, and a more static central database including POB and other 
referenc~ intelligence. The database is controlled by the JAC, and provides acces~ to theater 
databases~ ELINT databases, and some sanitized US source data. The system is deployed to all 
services, NATO headquarters, and operating forces down to Corps level. EUCOM is in the 
process of incorporating the JDISS into its intelligence architecture. 
33 
Attached are graphics that show the EUCOM structure for intelligence support for 
"peacemaking,,, and for punitive strike. Although dated, these charts provide an idea of the 
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Vll. THE JOINT TASK FORCE 
JTF, s to be formed up will have a JIC/JISE in support. The JIC/JISE will vary in size depending upon the J1F Commander's requirements and the nature of the JTF mission. Most of the CINC's plan to augment the J1F JIC/JISE with personnel from the CINC JIC, and 
also with NIST teams from the 12 JCS. Each J1F JIC/JISE will have at least one JDISS, and 
JWICS connectivity if at all possible. Note that recent changes to joint intelligence doctrine 
indicate that the JTF JIC may be called a Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE) to avoid 
confusion with the larger theater JIC. 
ACOM plans to have JTF 120 (NORTH} and J1F 140 (SOUTH) with a JIC and JDISS. 
EUCOM plans to organize a JTF-2 or CTF-2 with a Director of Intelligence (DI) and the 
following divisions: 
• Intelligence Operations (Air, Ground, Maritime, Collection, National Systems) 
• Plans {Threat, MC&G, Terrain/IPB, SWO) 
• Analysis (Crisis Action Team, Targets, BDA) 
• Support (Systems, Admin, SSO, CI, Security) 
Support to be via EISS (EUCOM Intel Support System), LOCE (Linked Ops/Intel Center 
Europe), and JDISS. 
COMTIDRDFLT during operation TANDEM THRUST used the following JTF 
organization: 
The DI (J2) was a Navy 06 who was part of the battle staff which included Ops, Intel, 
Plans, and Support. The Intelligence Division consisted of: · 
• Intel Plans/Support (Navy 04) (Plans and Admin) 
• Current Intel (Army 05) (Watch, Briefs, Strike, BDA) 
37 
• Mission Support (Navy 04) (Collection, Targets, National Assets) 
• Cryptology (Navy 05) (SIGINT Support, SI Comms) 
Attached is a diagram from Joint Publication 2-0, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to 
Operations", depicting a representative ]2 and Joint Intelligence Center, to include a National , 
Intelligence Support Team (NIST), a Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF), a Joint Captured Materiel 
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U S militaiy intelligence has built a new joint intelligence structure in a remarkably short time, to include modem workStations (the JDISS) and • • high capacity connectivity (the JWICS). This new intelligence structure 
follows closely the new joint command organizatio~ as it should, because the intelligence 
structure must provide support to command. Although the services were not pleased with the new 
joint intelligence structure initially, they now seem to support it, at least on the JCS/CINC/JTF 
levels that function on the strategic and operational levels of warfare. 
The services still retain intelligence organizations from the component level down, or what 
might be described as the tactical level of warfare. This has the advantage of providing direct 
intelligence support, but also presents problems regarding connectivity and the division of 
intelligence effort for interoperability and the unity of the intelligence effort. The architecture for 
the NMJIC, IlC/JAC, and the JTF IlC/IlSE structure seems well organized, and each service is 
engaged in building or improving its own intelligence architecture. Still at issue, however, is the 
connectivity, interoperability, and the division of infolligence effort among the services, as well as 
between the service components and the JTF. 
Targeting and BDA are still problems and, despite the lessons learned from the Persian 
Gulf War, there does not seem to be an obvious solution to this important aspect of warfare. 
Another area of concern is the differing requirements for CINC IlC's. Do the functional 
CINC's need the same type of IlC as the geographic CINC's ? Clearly, the area CINC's need a 
fairly extensive IlC, but do the functional CINC's need an elaborate IlC, or should they rely 
primarily on the area CINC's to provide their intelligence production support. 
The most serious problem facing the IlC/IAC structure is support to the actual operating 
forces. The tendency of intelligence organizations, especially when located with or near a CINC 
sta£t: is to support the CINC and the staff at the expense of the operating forces. This is an 
intelligence management problem, one that the J2 and even the CINC should monitor. 
On balance, however, the military intelligence organizations have accomplished a remarkable 
restructuring in a relatively short period of time. The concepts, workstations, and connectivity are 
in place and operating. Continuing good management is required to ensure that ~ structure 
provides.the required support to the CINC and to the operating forces. The service intelligence 
organizatfons need to ensure that the structure of the intelligence equipment acquired, and the 










A utlwr is indebted to the following soun:es in compiling this study: 
• ''Restructuring to Meet the Challenge" - A series of articles that appeared in the 
Naval Intelligence Bulletin, Summer 1992. 
• "Joint Intelligence and Uphold Democracy", Rear Admiral Thomas R. Wtlson, 
USN, Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1995. 
• The many JIC personnel who gave so much of their time to show me their 
organizations, and the graphics they provided that are included in this report. 
Note: Info on EUCOM is very dat~ having been collected during a briefinfonnal visit to 
EUCOM 12 in Oct 1992. 
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